The Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric coupled with Russia’s military setbacks are making Western politicians increasingly concerned about a possible Russian nuclear escalation in Ukraine. Recently, US officials have been alarmed by recorded conversations among high-ranking Russian military officials about a possible use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and the debate in Germany also continues.
It is increasingly being dominated by two extreme positions: one wants to give up Ukraine in order to appease Moscow and prevent a nuclear escalation. The others call for the greatest possible commitment to Ukraine and warn against surrendering in the face of Moscow’s nuclear blackmail.
However, these poles do not go far enough in terms of content. Rather, there is much to point to a nuclear dilemma: Abandon Ukraine, inflict a humiliating defeat on Putin, or slide into a long war – any of these three scenarios could have negative strategic repercussions or even the use of nuclear weapons.
Kyiv, Moscow and the West will not be released from this nuclear dilemma for the time being. They are driven by the situation towards an unsatisfactory outcome. And yet even this best of the bad options requires more strategic foresight and political determination.
A Western abandonment of Ukraine and a Russian conquest of the country would have dramatic strategic consequences – not to mention humanitarian ones. If the West deserted Kyiv, it would be tantamount to legitimizing wars of great power aggression under a nuclear shield.
The rule-based order is crumbling, and attempts at nuclear blackmail could increase
The alliances that provide the basis for security and prosperity in Asia and Europe would be weakened. They might even break over time. Add to this China’s ambitions for world power, America’s recurring aspirations of isolationism, and a long list of transnational problems, and the current rules-based order would come under even greater strain.
The accompanying uncertainty would lead to instability, depression and conflict. The importance of nuclear deterrence is likely to increase and proliferation risks to grow, and it would become more difficult to enforce international rules such as the ban on intervention. More nuclear blackmail attempts, like Russia’s, would make nuclear crises more likely.
To avoid this worrisome scenario, Western states could instead choose to provide even more massive support to Kyiv than before, thereby bringing about a speedy full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and a clear victory over Putin’s Russia.
From the Kremlin’s point of view, however, it should hardly be possible to explain such a devastating situation to the Russian population. They would be even less reconciled with Putin’s imperialist ideological ambitions. In addition, the loss of Crimea would have serious repercussions on Russia’s already eroding regional power.
What could trigger a Kremlin coup scenario?
Western sanctions would reduce the country’s economic potential, and Moscow’s friends in Damascus, New Delhi and Beijing could flee. In this way, Putin’s power clique could lose confidence in their leader. A coup in the Kremlin is a possibility, giving the increasingly isolated president sleepless nights.
Confronted with an impending ouster, the Kremlin leader could decide to use nuclear weapons. The cost to Russia would be immense. For Putin personally, however, they could appear justifiable in view of the potentially lethal alternative of regime change. In this situation, his threats would gain credibility.
If believed, they could force a western retreat. If, on the other hand, they are misinterpreted, an actual use of nuclear weapons would be possible – with dramatic consequences for Ukraine and the global order.
The third option in this dilemma is even less tempting: a slow slide into a protracted Vietnam-style military conflict with growing human and financial costs, binding the Kremlin and Russian society to victory or defeat and leaving the European continent in perpetual conflict transformed.
A Russian deployment in the style of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany (1941-1945) seems unimaginable today, but just a few months ago this also applied to partial mobilization, which then happened.
Over time, Moscow’s willingness to invest in the war would dwindle. But the Kremlin leadership would continue the fight to justify the many deaths, the broken economy and the torn society.
Putin only has two options: win or abdicate
On the one hand, a protracted war could produce an even more militarized and dictatorial Russian society, in which Putin’s power would be expanded and dissent even more repressed. On the other hand, a revolutionary mood would inevitably be in the air. At the very least, they would give the power clique in the Kremlin a headache. For Putin, there would be little choice but to win – or resign.
At this point, the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and an escalation against NATO would not be unlikely. And the West would be naïve not to look for an alternative solution.
Over the next few months, this dilemma will force Western policymakers to perform an uneasy balancing act: On the one hand, it will be necessary to continue to provide Ukraine with sufficient military and financial resources to strengthen its negotiating position.
On the other hand, attempts will be made to avoid a quick and humiliating Russian defeat, with all the risks that this entails. In addition, efforts will have to be made to persuade both Moscow and Kyiv to reach a compromise that will avert a long war.
This is an extremely difficult task. It now requires decisive action, a mix of carrot and stick. And it will require Western cohesion – first, to arm Kyiv and enable it to carry out further recaptures, and second, to convince Moscow too that further military escalation is pointless.
More importantly, the West is making a massive Marshall Plan 2.0-style effort to rebuild Ukraine so the government in Kyiv can sell an ugly compromise at home — and Russia recognizes that the West is sparing no expense in pursuing the rules-based to defend international order.
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Source: Tagesspiegel
I am an author and journalist with a focus on market news. I have worked for a global news website for the past two years, writing articles on a range of topics relating to the stock market. My work has been published in international publications and I have delivered talks at both academic institutions and business conferences around the world.
